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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the behaviour of public hospitals in response to the average payment 
incentives created by price changes for patients classified in different Diagnosis Related 
Groups (DRGs). Using panel data on public hospitals located within the Italian region of 
Emilia-Romagna, we test whether a one-year increase in DRG prices induced public 
hospitals to increase their volume of activity, and whether a potential response is associated 
with changes in waiting times and/or length of stay. We find that public hospitals reacted to 
the policy change by increasing the number of patients with surgical treatments. This effect 
was smaller in the two years after the policy change than in later years, and for providers 
with a lower excess capacity in the pre-policy period, whereas it did not vary significantly 
across hospitals according to their degree of financial and administrative autonomy. For 
patients with medical DRGs, instead, there appeared to be no effect on inpatient volumes. 
Our estimates also suggest that an increase in DRG prices either decreased or had no impact 
on the proportion of patients waiting more than six months. Finally, we find no evidence of 
a significant effect on patients’ average length of stay.  
 
JEL Classification: Analysis of health care markets (I11); Health production (I12); 
Government policy, regulation, public health (I18). 
 
Key words: DRG prices, average payment incentives, hospital behaviour. 
 
                                                 
 Corresponding author: 
Rossella Verzulli, Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Piazza Scaravilli, 2, 40126, Bologna 
(Italy). E-mail: rossella.verzulli@unibo.it; tel. +39-051-2098135. 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Assessing whether and how financial incentives affect the behaviour of health-care suppliers 
is a key factor for implementing welfare-enhancing policies. Information asymmetries and 
potentially diverging objectives between financing institutions and providers generate 
considerable challenges for the design of optimal reimbursement schemes, and a substantial 
body of research has analysed the implications of different payment mechanisms for health-
care delivery (Chalkley and Malcomson, 2000; 2012; McGuire, 2000).    
  
In the hospital sector, a large stream of literature has focused on the switch from a 
retrospective cost-based reimbursement scheme to a prospective payment system (PPS). 
Under cost-based reimbursement, hospitals are paid according to their actual costs, thereby 
receiving little incentive to be efficient. By contrast, under PPS hospitals receive a fixed 
price per case treated, with the amount varying according to the diagnostic category (DRG) 
assigned to each patient. Several studies have investigated the impact of eliminating 
marginal reimbursements during the transition to PPS.1 Most of them have found that a 
(neutral revenue) shift encourages hospital efficiency, although with potential unintended 
consequences on patient outcomes (Dranove, 2012). Yet relatively little attention has been 
drawn to the response of hospitals to changes in average reimbursement levels (DRG 
prices).    
 
Theoretical work predicts that, under PPS, hospitals are incentivised to attract more patients 
in response to an increase in DRG tariffs (e.g. Hodgkin and McGuire, 1994). This issue is 
attracting growing interest, as the transition to PPS has been completely phased in, and 
subsequent adjustments of DRG prices may constitute an important lever to steer  providers’ 
decisions. Some evidence is available on the impact of changes in average payment levels 
on the behaviour of hospitals operating in market-oriented institutional settings (e.g. 
Gilman, 2000; Dafny, 2005; Lindrooth et al, 2007; He and Mellor, 2012). However, very 
little is known on the effect in national health-care systems, where the response of public 
hospitals to DRG price changes can hardly be determined a priori (Januleviciute et al, 
2015). On the one hand, an increase in average payments may affect hospital activity when 
DRG tariffs are used to allocate public funding, especially if public hospitals are required to 
                                                 
1 For a given DRG, hospitals do not receive additional payments when they face a cost per case higher than the 
PPS price. 
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meet break-even conditions and are allowed to use financial surpluses for investment in 
patient care. Hospitals’ responsiveness to economic incentives is also expected to increase 
with the financial pressure exerted by restraints in public finances and by restrictive rules 
for bailing out hospital deficits.2 On the other hand, public hospitals may be less responsive 
to economic incentives than private providers due to differences in their objective function 
that may arise from public accountability and social obligations.3 It thus remains an open 
empirical question whether and how public hospitals react to changes in average payment 
incentives, and to what extent the evidence can be passed on across different institutional 
settings.  
 
This paper examines a policy change implemented in the Italian region Emilia-Romagna, 
whereby the prices of a subset of DRGs were increased in 2007 by 6% on average, whereas 
they were kept constant for the remaining DRGs from 2005 to 2010. We exploit this policy 
change to investigate the implications of an increase in average payment levels on the 
performance of public hospitals as measured by different indicators, including volumes of 
activity, waiting times and length of stay. Specifically, we assess whether increasing DRG 
prices induced public hospitals to expand the number of patients in the affected DRGs 
relative to the unaffected ones, and we evaluate the impact on the proportion of patients 
waiting more than six months and on patients’ average length of stay.   
 
Our analysis exploits a one-time shock in DRG prices to test for differences between short- 
and medium-run effects, an important but often neglected issue. Moreover, we investigate a 
policy change encompassing a wide range of conditions, while some earlier research (e.g. 
Allen et al, 2016) covered a more narrow set of procedures. Further, we consider a richer set 
of performance indicators than those previously examined for NHS systems, and assess 
whether the policy had a greater impact on hospitals enjoying a higher degree of autonomy 
                                                 
2 For a discussion on the role of soft budget constraints in the Italian public health sector, see Barbetta et al. 
(2007) and Bordignon and Turati (2009). 
3 Clark and Milcent (2014) find a significant gap in public-private employment levels in the French hospital 
sector associated to depressed local labour markets. The results suggest that public hospitals employment and 
local unemployment rates are positively correlated only in left-wing municipalities, with a larger correlation 
for tighter electoral races. Bloom et al (2015) show that hospital density in the UK is substantially higher in 
politically marginal constituencies, a feature attributed to the higher political costs of hospital closures. These 
pieces of evidence point to a significant influence of political factors on management practices in public 
hospitals. 
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over financial and organisational matters.4 Finally, we examine whether the price change 
affected hospitals with larger unused capacity more.  
 
Our findings indicate that, on average, hospitals responded to an increase in tariffs by 
raising the number of surgical (elective) treatments for the affected DRGs relative to the 
unaffected ones. This effect was smaller in the two years immediately after the price change 
and increased in the next two years: a 1% increase in the price of surgical DRGs raised the 
number of patients in affected DRGs by 1.7 and 4% in the short- and medium-run post-
policy periods, respectively. Moreover, providers with higher excess capacity before policy 
implementation displayed a larger response, whereas we do not find differences in hospitals’ 
response depending on their degree of administrative and financial autonomy. An increase 
in tariffs had no impact on the volumes of (elective) patients treated for medical DRGs. As 
for patients waiting more than six months, we find little evidence of a price effect, and no 
support emerges for the hypothesis that hospitals responded by altering patients’ average 
length of stay.   
 
 
2. Related literature 
 
The first studies to analyse the hospitals’ response to changes in average payments (price 
changes) at the diagnosis level utilise data covering the period of transition to PPS, and thus 
face the difficulty of disentangling the impact of simultaneous changes in average and 
marginal payment incentives (e.g. Newhouse, 1989; Cutler, 1995; Gilman, 2000). Dafny 
(2005) circumvents this problem by exploring the response of hospitals to changes in DRG 
prices in the post-PPS era. The contribution focuses on the behaviour of US Medicare 
program hospitals in response to a price change generated by the elimination of the age 
criterion in the description of DRG pairs, and shows a small impact in terms of volume of 
activity and intensity or quality of care. In more recent years, some studies have addressed 
DRG-specific responses of hospitals to price changes, mostly referring to the US context 
and examining the effect of reimbursement cuts by Medicare. Lindrooth et al (2007) find 
that hospitals with high-share Medicare patients decreased treatment intensity more than 
                                                 
4 While the effects on hospital performance from granting more financial and operational freedoms have 
received some attention in the UK (Marini et al, 2008; Verzulli et al, 2010; Allen et al, 2012), this issue is still 
relatively unexplored in the Italian context. 
5 
 
others, as they experienced larger reductions in average reimbursements. Moreover, the 
reduction was larger for the more generously reimbursed diseases and for patients requiring 
higher intensity. Other papers explore the impact of reductions in Medicare payments on 
health outcomes. While some of them find no adverse effects in the short-run (Seshamani et 
al, 2006), others highlight higher mortality rates in the long-run for hospitals facing larger 
payment cuts (Wu and Shen, 2014). Outside the US, Liang (2015) estimates the substitution 
and complementarity across DRGs with different profitability for hospitals under a DRG-
based payment scheme in Taiwan. The evidence supports both the hypothesis of positive 
own-price effects, with an increase in the share of patients for the more profitable DRGs, 
and of negative cross-price effects.  
 
Whereas the aforementioned studies have focused on hospital behaviour within competitive 
markets, a more limited stream of research has analysed hospital response to DRG price 
changes in national health-care systems. To the best of our knowledge, only two 
contributions explicitly address this issue. Allen et al (2016) analyse the Best Practice 
Tariffs (BPTs) reform in England, whereby the prices of a small group of interventions were 
set proactively to reflect the costs of delivering best practices, instead of reactively on the 
basis of average hospital costs. The results suggest that the policy increased the rate of day 
cases for the targeted procedures, with no detrimental effect in terms of mortality and 
readmission rates. Finally, Januleviciute et al (2015) analyse hospital response following 
continuous refinements in DRG prices within the Norwegian health-care system. Their 
findings indicate that, on average, an increase in DRG prices by 10% increased the number 
of emergency and elective patients with medical treatments by about 0.8 and 1.3%, 
respectively; whereas there is little evidence that hospitals adjusted the volume of surgical 
activity. Interestingly, these findings partly diverge from ours as we highlight a significant 
impact of price changes on surgical procedures for elective patients, but no effects emerge 
either for elective medical DRGs or for non-elective procedures. Differences in the design 
of the policy intervention, in the regulatory arrangements and in providers’ characteristics 
may explain part of the heterogeneity in the empirical results. Still, such mixed evidence 
confirms the importance of improving our understanding of the consequences of DRG price 
changes in NHS systems.  
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3. Data 
 
We use data on inpatient discharges at public hospitals sited in Italy’s region of Emilia-
Romagna.5 The Italian NHS provides universal and comprehensive care financed by general 
taxation, where provision of health-care services falls mainly under the responsibility of 
regional governments, and patients can freely choose hospital care from any publicly 
financed provider. The largest hospitals (Aziende Ospedaliere – AOs) are granted the status 
of autonomous Trusts and are extensively financed through the use of a DRG-based PPS. 
The remaining hospitals are managed by the Aziende Sanitarie Locali (ASLs), public 
enterprises mostly funded via a capitated budget and responsible for the delivery of care to 
their catchment population.6 Once the resources are assigned to each ASL, DRG prices are 
used by ASLs to quantify the activity of hospitals under their direct control, and thus 
contribute to setting their separate budgets. Such arrangements point towards a relevant role 
of DRG prices in allocating the available resources across all public hospitals (Cappellari et 
al, 2014).   
 
Our dataset combines patient records and DRG prices between 2005 and 2010. Patients data 
are drawn from the administrative hospital discharge dataset (Schede di Dimissione 
Ospedaliera, SDO). The SDO dataset contains patient-level information, including type of 
admission (elective or non-elective), booking date, date of admission and discharge, primary 
diagnosis (DRG), patient’s municipality of residence, and a hospital identifier. The sample 
used for the main analysis consists of all acute patients residing in the hospital’s catchment 
area who received an elective inpatient treatment between 2005 and 2010.7 Then, we 
matched our sample of patient-level information with the price tariffs set by the Regional 
Government for all the DRGs in use between 2005 and 2010. The data were then aggregated 
at the hospital-DRG-year level, leaving us with a final sample of 14,516 observations. The 
                                                 
5 This region is located in the North East of Italy, and has a total population of nearly 4 million people. 
6 The capitation formula depends on the population size, weighted by age-specific hospital utilization rates and 
risk-adjusted mortality rates, to account (at least partially) for the health-care needs of the population enrolled 
in each ASL.  
7 Our final sample covers all patients treated in the same area where they are enrolled, representing more than 
80% of total cases. Hospital care for patients residing outside the region is reimbursed on the basis of a 
national price schedule and, therefore, these patients are not included in our analysis. Moreover, we excluded 
highly complex procedures, such as organ transplants and treatments for patients with major burns and trauma 
conditions, as they are funded on the basis of block contracts. We also excluded patients treated in community 
hospitals, since these (smaller) facilities deal only with low complexity cases, and are subject to a funding 
scheme that does not apply the DRG prices used to reimburse the larger providers.  
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number of hospitals covered in the analysis is 14, whereas the total number of DRGs is 279, 
divided between 164 affected DRGs and 115 unaffected DRGs.8  
 
3.1 DRG prices 
 
Table I displays the summary statistics for the prices of medical and surgical DRGs (panel 
A and B, respectively), distinguishing between the affected DRGs (both pre- and post-
shock) and the unaffected ones. Average values are plotted in Figure 1 showing that prices 
for affected DRGs increased by an average of 111 Euro for medical DRGs and of 121 Euro 
for surgical DRGs. The average price is always lower for affected DRGs than for the 
unaffected ones, suggesting that the DRGs targeted by the policy change covered on 
average less complex procedures. Table II shows the descriptive statistics for the ratio 
between the pre- and post-policy prices of the affected DRGs, whose tariffs increased by 6% 
on average, with a range between 4 and 30% for medical DRGs, and between 4 and 20% for 
the surgical ones.   
 
3.2 Dependent variables 
 
Figure 2 plots the total number of yearly inpatient discharges by type of conditions and by 
treatment status between 2005 and 2010. For both medical and surgical treatments, the 
volume of activity is always higher for the affected DRGs than for the unaffected ones. We 
observe broadly parallel trends for both medical and surgical treatments between the 
affected and unaffected DRGs in the pre-policy years. Between 2007 and 2010, there was a 
small decline in the volume of medical treatments for patients in the group of affected 
DRGs, and no substantial change for patients in the unaffected DRGs. Conversely, we 
observe an increase in the number of surgical patients in the affected DRGs, and a slight 
decrease for those in the unaffected ones.  
 
Figures 3-4 show the time trends in the proportion of patients waiting more than six months 
and the average length of stay.9 As shown in Figure 3, the proportion of patients waiting 
                                                 
8 Since not all DRGs were treated by each hospital during each year between 2005 and 2010, the total number 
of observations included in our dataset is lower than 14 hospitals × 279 DRGs × 6 years. 
9 Waiting times are calculated as the time span between the date of admission and the date of decision to 
admit. 
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more than six months is higher for surgical than for medical treatments. We observe no 
relevant changes for the affected medical DRGs; whereas the unaffected ones display a 
limited variation until 2008, with a slight increase for the remaining period. For surgical 
treatments, the affected and unaffected DRGs follow broadly similar trends, with an 
increase in the proportion of patients waiting more than six months from 2005 to 2009, and 
a small reduction from 2009 to 2010. Finally, we record only very small changes over time 
in the average length of stay for all DRG groups (Figure 4).  
 
3.3 Hospital characteristics  
 
Our sample comprises 9 hospitals directly managed by ASLs and 5 AOs, with the latter 
having greater autonomy compared to ASL-run hospitals. We test whether AOs are more 
responsive to price changes relative to hospitals directly managed by ASLs. This offers the 
opportunity to analyse whether responsiveness to financial incentives increases with the 
administrative and financial autonomy enjoyed by hospitals. The manager’s roles differ 
across the two types of organisations: while in AOs the manager is the principal at the top of 
a two-layer hierarchy, with the doctors being on the bottom layer, in ASL-run hospitals he is 
the middle principal in a three-layer hierarchy, with the Local Health Authority being on the 
top layer. Altering the decision-making hierarchy may affect the incentives of the different 
decision-makers with potential consequences on hospital performance (Giuffrida et al, 
1999).   
 
In addition, we explore possible differences in hospitals’ responses due to different pre-
policy conditions as expressed in terms of the proportion of occupied beds before policy 
implementation. One may expect the policy change to have a greater impact on hospitals 
having higher levels of unused capacity prior to the price increase. To test this assumption, 
we use a pre-policy measure provided by the Health Department and computed as the ratio 
between the number of occupied beds and available beds in 2006. The variable is reported 
by hospital and type of DRGs (medical and surgical). Table III shows the summary 
statistics: for patients with medical conditions (panel A), the proportion of occupied beds in 
2006 was 88% on average (range 81-93%); for patients with surgical conditions (panel B) 
the proportion of occupied beds was 75% on average (range 69 - 83%). We assigned the 
values of the proportion of occupied beds reported by a single hospital for the groups of 
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medical and surgical DRGs in 2006 to the same hospital and type of DRGs in all years 
between 2005 and 2010. We then divided the sub-sample of surgical DRGs by low, medium 
and high tertiles of the occupancy rate distribution, and find that, for surgical patients, the 
proportion of occupied beds fell within one of the following ranges: up to 70% (low tertile), 
between 71 and 80% (medium tertile), and over 80% (high tertile). Since for medical 
procedures the proportion of occupied beds was always higher than 80%, we only focus on 
surgical treatments to test for the influence of different pre-policy bed occupancy rates.   
 
 
4. Estimation strategy 
 
Our baseline specification draws on Dafny (2005), with some modifications that account for 
the specific features of our data. It can be represented as follows: 
 
ln	ሺݕሻ௝௛௧ ൌ ௝ܼ௛ ൅ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଵΔlnሺ݌ሻ௝ ൈ ሺ݄ܵ݋ݎݐ_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧ ൅ ߚଶΔlnሺ݌ሻ௝ ൈ ሺܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧ 
																	൅	ߚଷܪ௛ ൈ ௧ܶ ൅ 	ߚସܦܴܩ௝ ൈ ܶ ൅ ߝ௝௛௧                                                                 (1)  
 
Eq. (1) is estimated for different dependent variables: the number of inpatient discharges; 
the proportion of patients waiting more than six months; and the average length of stay. We 
consider patients with the j DRG condition treated at hospital h in year t. The number of 
inpatient discharges and the average length of stay are included in log terms, whereas the 
proportion of patients waiting more than six months is expressed in percentage points. This 
allows to interpret the estimated coefficients as elasticities.  
 
Among the explanatory variables, we include DRG-by-hospital fixed effects, ௝ܼ௛, capturing 
time-invariant idiosyncratic characteristics of DRG j in hospital h; and year fixed effects 
(with the baseline year set to 2006), ௧ܶ, which control for shocks common to all DRGs in all 
hospitals. The key explanatory variables are Δlnሺ݌ሻ௝ ൈ ሺ݄ܵ݋ݎݐ_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧ and Δlnሺ݌ሻ௝ ൈ
ሺܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧. The first component of these interactions, Δlnሺ݌ሻ௝, measures the 
difference lnሺ݌ሻ௝௣௢௦௧_௦௛௢௖௞ െ lnሺ݌ሻ௝௣௥௘_௦௛௢௖௞, where ݌௝௣௢௦௧_௦௛௢௖௞ is the price of DRG j in the 
post-policy years, and ݌௝௣௥௘_௦௛௢௖௞ is the price of the same DRG before policy 
implementation. Thus, Δlnሺ݌ሻ௝ takes a value greater than zero for the DRGs targeted by the 
price change, and zero otherwise. In order to examine the effect of the price change in the 
10 
 
short- and medium-run post-policy periods, we interact Δlnሺ݌ሻ௝ with the dummies 
ሺ݄ܵ݋ݎݐ_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧, equal to one in the first two years after policy implementation (2007 and 
2008), and zero otherwise; and ሺܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧, equal to one in the two subsequent years 
(2009 and 2010), and zero otherwise. Finally, we include the interactions of hospital 
dummies with year fixed effects, ܪ௛ ൈ ௧ܶ, in order to control for possible time-varying 
hospital characteristics common to all DRGs (for instance, available beds and staff 
employed), and the set of interactions between each DRG and a linear time trend, ܦܴܩ௝ ൈ
ܶ, which ensure that the estimated effects do not reflect unobserved DRG characteristics 
affecting the dependent variables in the form of linear time trends.10  
 
We next estimate the following regression to investigate potential heterogeneous responses 
across hospitals by legal status:  
 
ln	ሺݕሻ௝௛௧ ൌ ௝ܼ௛ ൅ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଵΔlnሺ݌ሻ௝ ൈ ሺ݄ܵ݋ݎݐ_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧ ൅ ߚଶΔlnሺ݌ሻ௝ ൈ ሺܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧ 
																	൅	ߚଷΔlnሺ݌ሻ௝ ൈ ሺ݄ܵ݋ݎݐ_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧ ൈ ܣܵܮ௛ ൅ ߚସΔlnሺ݌ሻ௝ ൈ ሺܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧ ൈ ܣܵܮ௛                              
																	൅	ߚହܪ௛ ൈ ௧ܶ ൅ 	ߚ଺ܦܴܩ௝ ൈ ܶ ൅ ߝ௝௛௧                                                            (2)   
 
where ܣܵܮ௛ is a dummy variable taking the value one for ASL hospitals, and zero 
otherwise. Thus, the coefficients ߚଷ and ߚସ now capture the differential effect (if any) for 
ASL hospitals relative to AOs in the short- and medium-run post-policy periods, 
respectively.  
 
Finally, we investigate whether the response of hospitals varies depending on the proportion 
of occupied beds reported one year before policy implementation. This is done by 
estimating:   
 
ln	ሺݕሻ௝௛௧ ൌ ௝ܼ௛ ൅ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଵΔlnሺ݌ሻ௝ ൈ ሺ݄ܵ݋ݎݐ_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧ ൅ ߚଶΔlnሺ݌ሻ௝ ൈ ሺܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧ 
					൅	ߚଷΔlnሺ݌ሻ௝ ൈ ሺ݄ܵ݋ݎݐ_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧ ൈ ܯܱ௛ ൅	ߚସΔlnሺ݌ሻ௝ ൈ ሺ݄ܵ݋ݎݐ_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧ ൈ ܪܱ௛ 
															൅	ߚହΔlnሺ݌ሻ௝ ൈ ሺܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧ ൈ ܯܱ௛ ൅ ߚ଺Δlnሺ݌ሻ௝ ൈ ሺܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧ ൈ ܪܱ௛ 
																	൅	ߚ଻ܪ௛ ൈ ௧ܶ ൅ 	ߚ଼ܦܴܩ௝ ൈ ܶ ൅ ߝ௝௛௧      (3) 
                                                 
10 Note that the hospital and DRG main effects are absorbed into the DRG-by-hospital fixed effects, ௝ܼ௛. 
Following previous studies (e.g. Dafny, 2005; Januleviciute et al, 2015), we use DRG-specific linear time 
trends as a feasible alternative to DRG-year interactions.  
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where ܯܱ௛ and ܪܱ௛ are dummy variables for each hospital h, which take value one for 
hospitals within the medium and high tertiles of the occupancy rate distribution, and zero 
otherwise.11 Thus, the coefficients ߚଵ and ߚଶ now capture the effect of a price increase for 
hospitals within the low tertile of the occupancy rate distribution (the reference category) in 
the short- and medium-run respectively. The additional effects for those falling within the 
medium and high tertiles are given by, respectively, ߚଷ and ߚହ in the short-run, and ߚସ and 
ߚ଺ in the medium-run. If larger responses occur for hospitals characterised by higher levels 
of unused capacity before policy change, the estimated coefficients ߚଷ-ߚ଺ will be negative. 
We present here the results of Eq. (3) only on the sub-sample of surgical patients since, as 
previously highlighted, for medical patients the proportion of occupied beds reported by 
hospitals in year 2006 was always higher than 80% across all sample hospitals.  
 
 
5. Results 
 
Table IV presents the results for Eq. (1), estimated for medical and surgical DRGs 
separately. The dependent variable for the estimates reported in the first two columns is the 
number of inpatient discharges. Our findings indicate that an increase in medical DRG 
prices did not lead to significant changes in the volume of medical activity for the affected 
DRGs relative to the unaffected ones. By contrast, we find that a 1% increase in the price of 
surgical DRGs increased the volume of surgical activity for the affected DRGs, as compared 
to the unaffected ones, by an amount of 1.7% in the short-run and 4% in the medium-run. 
The remaining columns of Table IV display the results for the other outcomes of interest, 
and show that an increase in DRG prices had a negative but not significant impact on the 
proportion of patients waiting more than six months, and a positive but, again, not 
significant impact on average length of stay.  
 
We then examine the influence of hospital legal status using the specification proposed in 
Eq. (2). As Table V shows, we do not find significant differences in the response patterns 
between the two groups of hospitals for any outcome considered, suggesting that the 
reaction of public hospitals to changes in DRG prices does not seem to be affected by the 
degree of their administrative and financial independence. 
                                                 
11 See section 3.3 for the details on how these variables were generated. 
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Table VI shows the results from Eq. (3) where we consider the role of pre-policy levels of 
unused capacity. With respect to the volume of surgical activity, we find evidence that an 
increase in DRG prices led to a larger response for hospitals holding a higher excess 
capacity before policy change. Specifically, hospitals falling within the lowest tertile of the 
occupancy rate distribution (our baseline category) display a positive and significant impact 
both in the short- and in the medium-run post-policy periods by an amount equal to 2.6 and 
6%, respectively. This effect is significantly lower for hospitals within the medium tertile, 
and becomes statistically insignificant for hospitals with a bed occupancy rate higher than 
80% (highest tertile).12 In terms of the proportion of patients waiting more than six months, 
the policy change had a negative and significant (at the 10% level) impact for hospitals with 
the lowest bed occupancy rates, whereas the effect becomes statistically insignificant for 
hospitals holding higher bed occupancy rates. Finally, our results on the average length of 
stay suggest that an increase in DRG prices produced no significant effect irrespective of the 
pre-policy levels of unused capacity.13 
 
Finally, we test the restriction imposed by Eq. (1)-(3), where we estimated the impact of the 
price increase on our outcome variables by grouping years 2007-2008 into short-run post-
policy period, and years 2009-2010 into medium-run post-policy period. By doing so, we 
are implicitly assuming that the effect of the price increase was not significantly different 
between 2007 and 2008, and between 2009 and 2010. In Table VII, we show the results 
from a more flexible estimation specification, where we replaced the interaction terms 
Δlnሺ݌ሻ௝ ൈ ሺ݄ܵ݋ݎݐ_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧ and Δlnሺ݌ሻ௝ ൈ ሺܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉_ݎݑ݊ሻ௧ with the set of interactions 
∑ Δlnሺ݌ሻ௝ ൈ ௧ܶଶ଴ଵ଴௧ୀଶ଴଴଻ , where ௧ܶ is a dummy variable for year t. The results provided by this 
flexible specification show the similarity of the effects between years 2007 and 2008, and 
between 2009 and 2010.14  
 
 
                                                 
12 Bearing in mind that the total effect for these hospitals is captured by the sum ሺߚଵ ൅ ߚଷሻ in the short-run, 
and by ሺߚଵ ൅ ߚହሻ in the medium-run. 
13 We also repeated the regression analysis on the sub-sample of medical DRGs, after grouping the occupancy 
rate distribution that we observe for these treatments by low, medium and high tertiles. In general, we do not 
detect any significant difference in the response of hospitals according to their proportion of occupied beds 
reported in the pre-policy period. The only exception is in terms of volume of activity: we find a positive but 
not significant effect for hospitals falling within the low and medium tertiles, and a significantly smaller effect 
for the remaining hospitals. These results are available upon request. 
14 We find no significant difference between the effects in 2007 and 2008, and between the effects in 2009 and 
2010.  
13 
 
6. Validity of the estimation specification 
 
The identification of the causal effect of the price change is challenged by the underlying 
non-random selection of the targeted DRGs, a limitation shared by most large scale policy 
interventions. However, the policy design and the identification strategy allow us to account 
for policy endogeneity.  
 
The targeted DRGs were identified according to data on costs aggregated at the specialty 
level and collected from a subset of regional hospitals in 2005, two years before the policy 
change. This provided policymakers only with rough indications on the cost-compensation 
gap across DRGs. Moreover, the available information on costs was partially outdated in 
2007. Given this background, the policymaker’s decision was to implement tariff changes 
that were largely uniform across DRGs rather than to fine-tune the adjustments according to 
DRG-specific tariff-cost gaps, thus leading to changes in tariffs that were poorly correlated 
to the actual costs experienced in the majority of hospitals in 2007.15  
 
Besides the institutional features discussed above, the empirical strategy further mitigates 
possible concerns over potential endogeneity issues. First, we explicitly account for possible 
differences in the dependent variables between affected and unaffected DRGs that may have 
been caused by factors other than the policy change. For this purpose, we control for fixed 
differences in hospital performance between the two diagnoses groups via the DRG-by-
hospital fixed effects. Thus, all time-invariant differences between DRGs that may affect the 
outcome variables of interest will be absorbed into the DRG-by-hospital fixed effects. Time-
varying changes common to all DRGs are captured by the year fixed effects. Moreover, we 
followed prior studies (e.g. Dafny, 2005; Januleviciute et al, 2015) by including DRG-
specific time trends in order to control for the possible variation in hospital performance 
across DRGs over time.  
 
Second, we also consider the possibility that time-varying (unobserved) confounding factors 
may be correlated to both increases in DRG tariffs and differential trends in hospital 
performance between affected and unaffected DRGs in the pre-policy period. We test for 
this by performing a falsification test similar to the one adopted in previous studies 
                                                 
15 The tariff increase was in most cases set at the uniform rate of 4%. Moreover, it was not replicated in the 
following four years, confirming that it was intended as a one-time price shock. 
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(Clemens et al, 2014, among others). We check for pre-existing trends correlated with price 
changes by adding to the baseline specification illustrated in Eq. (1) the interaction between 
the log ratio in the DRG prices after and prior to the policy change, Δlnሺ݌ሻ௝, and a dummy 
variable for the pre-policy year 2005. The premise is that, since DRG prices did not change 
before 2007, we should not expect to find a significant coefficient for this interaction term. 
By contrast, the presence of a significant effect would be consistent with the hypothesis of 
different pre-existing trends in the dependent variables which would challenge the 
identification of the estimated impact of the policy change. The results of this falsification 
test are presented in Table VIII: the interaction coefficients with year 2005 are not 
statistically significant, while the estimated coefficients for the other key covariates remain 
stable. As we find no evidence that the price change was correlated with pre-existing trends 
in the dependent variables, this result supports our identification strategy. 
  
To reinforce the contention that our results are not capturing a spurious effect, we also 
repeat our analysis on non-elective patients. Since non-elective patients need immediate 
treatment (within 48 hours), hospitals cannot rely on waiting times to ration demand for 
these patients. As long as the provision of non-elective care is outside hospital control, one 
should expect price changes to generate a smaller (or no) impact on non-elective treatments. 
On the contrary, in the case of a spurious price effect, price changes may be found to affect 
both elective and non-elective admissions. The results from this placebo-test are reported in 
Table AI in the Appendix. For non-elective patients we find no significant effect on any 
outcome of interest, a result which goes in favour of our claim of a genuine causal effect 
induced by the change in DRG prices.  
 
 
7. Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper investigated the impact of a policy change implemented in Italy’s region Emilia-
Romagna, which increased the price of a subset of DRGs by 6% on average. We evaluated 
whether the price increase affected the performance of public hospitals differently between 
affected and unaffected diagnoses. Specifically, we examined hospital response in terms of 
the number of inpatient discharges, proportion of patients waiting more than six months, and 
average length of stay. Differently from most of the literature, we considered a context with 
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dominant public suppliers. Although the mandate to meet the health needs of the reference 
population and the political accountability of public hospitals may weaken their 
responsiveness to financial incentives, variations in DRG prices may still matter also within 
national health-care systems where tariffs are used to allocate public funds, in particular if 
public hospitals are allowed to retain financial surpluses for improving health-care services.  
 
Our contribution to the literature spans several dimensions: we presented comprehensive 
evidence on the impact of an increase in DRG prices on the performance of public hospitals 
as measured by the number of inpatient discharges, waiting times and length of stay; we 
explored potential differences between short- and medium-run effects and investigated 
whether the magnitude of the response is affected by hospital legal status; finally, we 
analysed the role of unused capacity as a factor that may contribute to explaining the 
variation in hospital responses. We find that, on average, public hospitals did respond to the 
increase in DRG prices by significantly expanding their volume of activity provided to 
surgical (elective) patients for the diagnoses affected by the price change relative to the 
unaffected ones. This effect also increased from the short- to the medium-run: a 1% increase 
in the price of surgical DRGs led to an increase in the number of patients treated with the 
affected DRGs relative to the unaffected ones by 1.7% in the short-run and by 4% in the 
medium-run. This suggests that it may take some time for hospitals to fully adjust their 
activity in response to price increases. We do not reject the hypothesis of homogeneous 
responses by hospital legal status, while we find evidence of heterogeneous responses 
according to hospitals’ excess capacity in the pre-policy period, with the hospitals 
characterised by a lower proportion of occupied beds being relatively more responsive. For 
medical DRGs, we find no significant effect in terms of volume of activity. Since hospitals 
were found to have a higher proportion of occupied beds for these diagnoses, this finding is 
consistent with the expectation that hospitals with higher unused capacity before policy 
implementation were more reactive to the change.  
 
In terms of waiting times, we find little evidence of a price effect. In principle, the stimulus 
to increase hospital activity in response to the policy change may induce hospitals to shorten 
waiting times. Although not statistically significant in the majority of cases, the direction of 
our findings support this hypothesis for patients that reported longer waiting times (in our 
study, for surgical than medical patients), and that the negative effect on waiting times 
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increases with the level of unused capacity reported before policy implementation. Finally, 
we find no evidence of any impact of the price change on the average length of stay. 
  
Our study bears also some limitations. First, we did not have information with which to test 
whether increases in DRG prices translated into changes in other important aspects of 
hospital performance including clinical outcomes. Moreover, we cannot observe the 
underlying costs dynamics, and this prevented us from examining whether responses across 
hospitals depend on the gap between DRG prices and actual costs. Despite this, an analysis 
of the impact of a one-time change in DRG tariffs provides potentially relevant policy 
insights under PPS within NHS-based systems, where DRG tariffs may serve as a key tool 
to steer hospital activity.   
 
Taken together, our findings suggest that DRG tariffs affect the decisions of public hospitals 
and can be exploited to encourage the delivery of certain treatments. Such effects may vary 
over time and according to the pre-policy conditions under which hospitals operate, as we 
find a greater impact in the medium-run and for providers with a higher unused capacity 
before policy implementation.  
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Table I. Descriptive statistics for DRG prices (Euro)  
 
 No. of DRGs Mean SD Min Max 
Panel A: Medical DRGs      
Affected DRGs       
   Pre-shock  114 1978.32 830.95 687.92 5195.48 
   Post-shock  114 2088.86 853.58 715.44 5403.30 
Non-affected DRGs      
   Pre-shock and post-shock  59 2479.40 1035.09 440.79 5283.31 
      
Panel B: Surgical DRGs      
Affected DRGs      
   Pre-shock  50 2324.82 1201.95 570.55 5906.47 
   Post-shock  50 2446.25 1237.51 593.37 6142.73 
Non-affected DRGs      
   Pre-shock and post-shock  56 3407.71 2222.62 787.59 10146.54 
 
 
 
Table II. Descriptive statistics for the ratio between post- and pre-policy prices of affected 
DRGs (Euro) 
 
  No. of DRGs Mean SD Min Max 
Panel A: Medical DRGs      
(pjpost_shock/pjpre_shock) 114 1.06 0.06 1.04 1.30 
      
Panel B: Surgical DRGs      
(pjpost_shock/pjpre_shock) 50 1.06 0.04 1.04 1.20 
 
 
 
Table III. Hospital bed occupancy rates, 2006 data 
 
 Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Panel A: Medical DRGs      
Bed occupancy rates 1420 87.72 3.09 81.36 92.90 
      
Panel B: Surgical DRGs      
Bed occupancy rates 1070 75.29 5.36 69.12 83.48 
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Table IV. Average price effects on the number of inpatient discharges, % of patients waiting more than six months and average length of stay 
 
  ln(number of inpatient discharges)  
% patients waiting  
more than six months  ln(average length of stay) 
 Medical DRGs Surgical DRGs  Medical DRGs Surgical DRGs  Medical DRGs Surgical DRGs 
Δln(p) × (Short_run) -0.214 1.733**  -0.050 -0.170  0.115 0.095 
 (0.628) (0.584)  (0.073) (0.165)   (0.265) (0.486) 
Δln(p) × (Medium_run) 0.281 3.973***  -0.101 -0.175  0.329 0.041 
 (0.915) (1.127)  (0.159) (0.300)  (0.611) (0.703) 
         
Hospital-DRG F.E. Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Year F.E. Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Hospital × Year interaction Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
DRG trends Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
         
Adj. R-squared  0.765 0.863  0.199 0.414  0.467 0.659 
Obs. 8251 6265   8251 6265   8251 6265 
 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital level are in parentheses. 
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Table V. Responses to the policy change by legal status 
 
  ln(number of inpatient discharges)  
% patients waiting  
more than six months  ln(average length of stay) 
 Medical DRGs Surgical DRGs  
Medical 
DRGs Surgical DRGs  Medical DRGs Surgical DRGs 
Δln(p) × (Short_run) -0.207 1.961**   -0.030 -0.363*  0.429 0.085 
 (0.699) (0.697)  (0.069) (0.200)  (0.354) (0.592) 
Δln(p) × (Short_run) × ASL -0.011 -0.381  -0.034 0.325  -0.545 0.020 
 (0.784) (0.626)  (0.075) (0.206)  (0.325) (0.448) 
Δln(p) × (Medium_run) 0.251 3.721**  -0.104 -0.200  0.622 -0.283 
 (1.216) (1.622)  (0.153) (0.414)  (0.669)  (0.797)  
Δln(p) × (Medium_run) × ASL 0.054 0.428  0.007 0.043  -0.500 0.551 
 (0.859)  (1.224)  (0.063) (0.353)   (0.367) (0.394) 
         
Hospital-DRG F.E. Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Year F.E. Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Hospital × Year interaction Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
DRG trends Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
         
Adj. R-squared  0.765 0.863  0.199 0.414  0.467 0.659 
Obs. 8251 6265  8251 6265  8251 6265 
 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital level are in parentheses. 
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Table VI. Responses to the policy change by bed occupancy rate 
 
  ln(number of inpatient discharges)  
% patients waiting  
more than six months  ln(average length of stay) 
 Surgical DRGs  Surgical DRGs  Surgical DRGs 
Δln(p) × (Short_run) 2.595**  -0.251*  0.563 
 (1.078)  (0.135)  (0.631) 
Δln(p) × (Short_run) × MO -0.781  0.027  -0.877  
 (0.741)  (0.289)  (0.498) 
Δln(p) × (Short_run) × HO -1.926**  0.232  -0.532 
 (0.865)  (0.326)  (0.424) 
Δln(p) × (Medium_run) 5.980***  -0.287  0.767 
 (1.530)  (0.382)   (0.713) 
Δln(p) × (Medium_run) × MO -2.331**  0.0987  -1.306**  
 (0.940)  (0.519)  (0.467) 
Δln(p) × (Medium_run) × HO -3.845***  0.248  -0.876 
 (0.770)  (0.519)  (0.504) 
         
Hospital-DRG F.E. Y  Y  Y 
Year F.E. Y  Y  Y 
Hospital × Year interaction Y  Y  Y 
DRG trends Y  Y  Y 
         
Adj. R-squared  0.864  0.413  0.659 
Obs. 6265   6265   6265 
 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital level are in parentheses. 
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Table VII. Flexible specification 
 
 ln(number of inpatient discharges)  
% patients waiting  
more than six months  ln(average length of stay) 
  Medical DRGs Surgical DRGs  Medical DRGs Surgical DRGs  Medical DRGs Surgical DRGs 
Δln(p) × (Year2007) 0.117 2.029**  0.067 -0.241  0.030 -0.069 
 (0.746) (0.818)  (0.114) (0.224)  (0.433) (0.523) 
Δln(p) × (Year2008) 0.485 3.197**  0.289 -0.444  -0.294 0.179 
 (0.993) (1.410)  (0.204) (0.308)  (0.671) (0.564) 
Δln(p) × (Year2009) 1.099 5.657**  0.292 -0.492  -0.141 0.116 
 (1.251) (2.091)  (0.314) (0.393)  (1.069) (0.687) 
Δln(p) × (Year2010) 1.516 5.814*  0.414 -0.548  -0.185 -0.193 
 (1.601) (2.779)  (0.428) (0.570)  (1.357) (0.846) 
         
Hospital-DRG F.E. Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Year F.E. Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Hospital × Year interaction Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
DRG trends Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
         
Adj. R-squared  0.765 0.863  0.199 0.414  0.467 0.659 
Obs. 8251 6265   8251 6265   8251 6265 
 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital level are in parentheses. 
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Table VIII. Falsification test of pre-existing trends correlated with the price changes 
 
 ln(number of inpatient discharges)  
% patients waiting  
more than six months  ln(average length of stay) 
  Medical DRGs Surgical DRGs  Medical DRGs Surgical DRGs  Medical DRGs Surgical DRGs 
Δln(p) × (Pre_policy) 0.392 0.662  0.173 -0.130  -0.187 -0.030 
 (0.400) (0.749)  (0.113) (0.159)  (0.297) (0.252) 
Δln(p) × (Short_run) -0.287 1.619**  -0.082 -0.148  0.150 0.100 
 (0.626) (0.616)  (0.080) (0.169)  (0.254) (0.501) 
Δln(p) × (Medium_run) -0.064 3.416**   -0.253 -0.066  0.494 0.067 
 (0.968) (1.218)  (0.165) (0.348)  (0.529)   (0.812) 
         
Hospital-DRG F.E. Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Year F.E. Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Hospital × Year interaction Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
DRG trends Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
         
Adj. R-squared  0.765 0.863  0.199 0.414  0.467 0.659 
Obs. 8251 6265   8251 6265   8251 6265 
 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital level are in parentheses. 
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Figure 1. Mean prices of affected and non-affected DRGs,  
by year and type of DRG 
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Figure 2. Number of elective inpatient discharges at all hospitals,  
by year and type of DRG 
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Figure 3. Percentage of elective patients waiting more than six months at all hospitals,  
by year and type of DRG 
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Figure 4. Average length of stay for patients discharged at all hospitals,  
by year and type of DRG 
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Table AI. Falsification test on the sub-sample of non-elective patients 
 
 ln(number of inpatient discharges)  ln(average length of stay) 
  Medical DRGs Surgical DRGs  Medical DRGs Surgical DRGs 
Δln(p) × (Pre_policy) 0.411 0.484  -0.075 0.270 
 (0.245) (0.311)  (0.134) (0.325) 
Δln(p) × (Short_run) -0.336 0.259  0.137 0.034 
 (0.382) (0.622)  (0.117) (0.257) 
Δln(p) × (Medium_run) -0.679 -0.047  0.445 -0.722 
 (0.714) (1.234)  (0.272) (0.438) 
      
Hospital-DRG F.E. Y Y  Y Y 
Year F.E. Y Y  Y Y 
Hospital × Year interaction Y Y  Y Y 
DRG trends Y Y  Y Y 
      
Adj. R-squared  0.907 0.860  0.702 0.724 
Obs. 13328 5217   13328 5217 
 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital level are in parentheses. 
 
 
